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Abstract
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k-Anonymity protects privacy by ensuring that data cancanindividual. In a k-anonymous
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I. Introduction
Introduction
The tension between the value of using personal data
for research, and concern over individual privacy, is everincreasing. Simply removing uniquely identifying information (SSN, name) from data is not sufficient to prevent
identification because partially identifying information (quasiidentifiers; age, sex, city ...
.. .)) can still be mapped to individuals using publicly available knowledge [19]. Table I shows
one such example where an attacker, by using a public dataset,
can map the names of the students to the sensitive GPA
information, even though the released private table does not
This
by
This material is based upon work supported
supported b
y the National Science
Science
Foundation under Grant No.
No. 0428168.
0428168.

disclose the names of the students.
students. (E.g., a student with age
"18",
"18", sex "M"
"M" and city "Lafayette"
"Lafayette" has GPA "2.34".
"2.34". Luke is
the only person with these attributes in the public dataset.)
k-Anonymity[l6]
k-Anonymity[ 16] is one technique to protect against the
linkage and identification of records. In a k-anonymous table,
each distinct tuple in the projection over quasi-identifier
attributes occurs at least k times. Private tables are kanonymized by the use of generalizations and suppressions,
with the result having two key properties:
• In the anonymous dataset, an individual can only be
linked to a group of at least kk private entities.
entities.
• Every tuple of the anonymous dataset correctly represents a unique tuple in the private dataset (There is no
false or noisy information.)
Table I shows a 2-anonymization of the above mentioned
private table. Given the 2-anonymized table, an attacker can
at best link Luke into GPAs "3.72"
"3.72" and "2.34".
"2.34".
k-Anonymity does not enforce diversity on the sensitive
information of equivalence classes (set of tuples with the
same identifying attributes in k-anonymous dataset). This
has lead to extended privacy definitions [6], [13]. However
if all sensitive attributes in the private table are unique, kanonymity ensures that linkage will only be possible to groups
of k-distinct sensitive values.
To achieve k-anonymity in single-table datasets, numerous generalization (replacing data values with more general
values) and suppression algorithms have been proposed [17],
[I 71,
[7], [8],
[a], [10],
[lo], [4],
[4], [11],
[ l l ] , [3], [5], [15].
[15]. These algorithms
assume each private entity is stored as one row in a single
attribute-value table. When information about a private entity
is contained in multiple tables, and not easily represented
in a single table, the existing definitions and algorithms are
insufficient. In Section II,
11, this paper extends the k-anonymity
multi-Relational setting; Section III
111 discusses
definitions to a multi-Relational
why multiR anonymity (multirelational k-anonymity) is a
new problem that is not solved by previous k-anonymity
algorithms.
Single dimensional k-anonymity algorithms were designed
to specify generalization
generalization mappings (or complete suppression

of values) for data values in the dataset to optimize against a
certain metric. Some of such algorithms used pruning methods
to reduce the size of the search space for optimal k-anonymity
[10],
[lo], [4]. However in a multiR anonymity setting, the search
space is much bigger and simple modifications won't be
as efficient unless the original optimality is sacrificed by
[ll], [5],
[ 5 ] , it was shown
using other assumptions. In [15], [11],
that although not optimal, a multidimensional approach to
k-anonymity can offer more flexibility in anonymizations.
Among this family of algorithms, the clustering based approach is more suitable to the multiR setting due to the
ease in explicit identification of the entity being protected
(anonymized) in the dataset. In Section IV, protected entities
and associated relations will be abstracted by trees and a modification of a previously proposed clustering algorithm will be
presented to provide multiR anonymity on snowflake schemas.
Section V will present experimental results evaluating the new
approach in terms of precision and execution time.

II.
MuitiR Anonymity
11. MultiR
We now define notations and k-anonymity for the multiR
setting. Given a table T, T[c][r]
T[c][r] refers to the value of column
T . T[c]
T[c] is the projection of column c
c, row r of T.
PT
Definition 1I (Person specific table): A table P
T is said to
U if and only if it
be person specific w.r.t. some population V
contains a primary key attribute (or set of attributes) vzp
vip such
that each value of vip uniquely corresponds to an individual
in V.
U.
Definition 2 (MultiR
(MultiR schema):
U and a
schema): A set of tables S
SV
SF corresponds to a multiR
set of functional dependencies SF
schema if S
SV
U is a dependency preserving, lossless join
decomposition w.r.t. SF
SF and there exists one person specific
U where each row corresponds to an individual
table P
TES
PT
SV
in population V.
U. We say a database with such a schema
M R(SF, V,
PT,
ST,
has the transcript MR(SF,
U, P
T,S
T , vip), where vip
vzp is the
PT
SV
=S
U -- {PT}.
{PT).
unique identifier in P
T and ST
ST=
I1 shows an example for a multiR database with
Table II
transcript M R
( S F , V,
U, T
T,,p , {TI,
{TI, T2},
Tz), Sid)
SF={Sid ->
-,
R(SF,
Sid) where SF={Sid
GPA, SCid ->
+ {Sid, Course, Grade}
Grade) }) and V
U is the set of
students. The schema is in BCNF and dependency preserving.
quasi-identifier definition is a reformulation
The following quasi-identifier
reformulation
of the definition in [18].
Definition 33 (Quasi-identifier):
(Quasi-identifier): Let
MR(SF,
U, P
T , {Tl,'"
{TI,. . . ,,Tn},
T,), vip)
vzp) be a multiR database,
M R(SF, V,
PT,
T == P
T Mw TI
Tl Mw ...
. . . Mw Tn.
T,. Let fc
U ->
-, JJT
T and
PT
fe : V
and JJT
fg
T ->
--t V',
U', where V
U ~ V'.
U'. A quasi-identifier of M R
fg :: JJT
R,,
QMR,
T where 3Pi
3pi E V
U
written Q
M R, is a subset of attributes of JJT
such that fg(fc(pi)[QMR])
fg(fe(Pi)[QMR]) = pi,
Pi, and an adversary knows
QMR for pi.
the values of QMR
Pi.
Informally a quasi-identifier for a schema is the set of
attributes in JT that can be used to externally link or identify a
PT.
given tuple in P
T . In Table II,
11, Course and Book attributes can
be considered quasi-identifiers since colleagues of a student
may know this information about their friend. The attributes
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TABLE
TABLE IV. Notations
Notations for a given
given database M R ii
table
vipZ
z

L

SBU'
Uz
JJT'
TZ
QMRi
SnnRi

private entity attribute in M
M R iZ
R'Z
the person specific table of M R
(vipi
(vipZis the primary key)
the set of all tables in M R
R'2
PTi
excluding PTi
the set of all tables in M R
R'Z
join
join of all tables in M R
R'Z
set of quasi identifier attributes
set of sensitive attributes

GPA, Grade, Price are the sensitive attributes of the private
entity Sid. An attacker knows the quasi-identifiers
quasi-identifiers about an
entity and tries to discover other (sensitive) information in
11, we assume the attacker knows
the data. E.g., in Table II,
U takes the courses 'History'
that some individual George in V
History' for
and 'Religion'
'Religion' and uses the text book 'American
'American History'
the 'History'
'History' course.
course. The attacker wants to discover George's
(sensitive) GPA or his grade in the 'History'
'History' course. If the data
is released as it is, even though George's name is hidden, the
attacker can easily link George to student S4 and GPA '4.00'
'4.00'
join keys
'98'. We also have other join
or SCid SClO and grade '98'.
in Table I1
II like the vip attribute Sid or SCid that are not part
of the quasi-identifier
quasi-identifier set.
For the rest of the paper, we will use the notation given
in Table IV. From now on, if not mentioned otherwise,
we will use superscripts to name different multiR databases
M R I , M R 22 ,, ...
(e.g., MR1,
. . . ).). Superscript for other notations will
show membership to the associated multiR database (e.g.,
vipl
vip l is vip of MR1.).
M R I .). We will use superscript * for multiR
anonymizations.
anonymizations. Subscripts will distinguish different elements
of the same multiR database (e.g., TI,
T,: Ti
T: E ST
ST^I of M
R I~).) .
MR
Equivalent): Two
Definition 4 (Structurally Equivalent):
databases
M
M RRI ~and M R 22 have structurally equivalent schemas if and
2
vip2,
only if vipl
, PT'
vip l == vip
PT I has the same set of attributes as
2
PT, , and there exist bijective mapping between the set of
PT'
ST^I and ST
ST^2 such that tables mapped have the same
tables ST
set of attributes. Structurally equivalent schemas have the
same functional dependencies, population, QI, sensitive and
joining attribute sets.
non-QI joining
The MultiR databases given in Tables II
III are an
I1 and 111
example of structural equivalence.
databases): Let
Definition 55 (k-anonymity for multiR databases):
M Rand
R and M R
R** be two multiR databases with the same set of
M RWe say M
R*
QI QMR and set of sensitive attributes S
SMR.
MR*
k-anonymization of M
MR
is a k-anonymization
R if and only if Vv(JT*),
Vv(JT*), (views
on JJT*)
T * ) the following properties hold:

I) anonymized: any query of the type II,tt(v(JT*))
1)
IIatt(v(JT*)) where
att E S
SMR
aU
M R returns either zero tuples or at least k (not
necessarily distinct)t
distinct)' tuples,
'k-anonymity
1
k-anonymity allows sensitive attribute values to be the same over the
attributes. Other approaches like &diversity
set of tuples with the same QI attributes.
i-diversity
and t-closeness enforce constraints over the distribution of such groups
of sensitive values.
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TABLE
private table (university
(university alumni
TABLE I.I. An
An example
example public
public table
table (university
(university registration
registration database), private
database)
=2
database) and
and an
an anonymization
anonymization of the private
private table
table where k =
table
table
Public Dataset

Name

Age

Sex

Chris
Luke
Luke
Padme
Padme
George

19
18
27
25

M
M

Priva
te Dataset
Private
City
Indianapolis
Lafayette
Lafayette
Lafayette
Lafayette
W. Lafayette

F
M

Age

Sex

19
18
27
25
25

M
M
F
M
M

City
Indianapolis
Lafayette
Lafayette
Lafayette
Lafayette
W. Lafayette
Lafayette

Anonymized Dataset
Dataset
Anonymized

GPA
3.72
2.34
3.12
4.00

Age

Sex

10-20
10-20
20-30
20-30

M
M

*
*

City
Indiana
Indiana
G. Lafayette
G.. Lafayette
G

GPA
3.72
2.34
3.12
4.00

TABLE
T2:Books bought by student for course
TABLE II.
II. Tp:Student
T,:Student has
has GPA;
GPA; T1:Student
Tl:Student takes courses;
courses; T2:Books
table
table

1 Sid 1 GPA 1 lSCidlSidl
/ S1 1 3.72 1 I SCI I S1 I Math 1 93 1

~
TP

n
Tl

CGosaeudlri SCid

l

Book

I Price

w

n

7'2

TABLE
= 2
TABLE III.
Ill. One
One anonymization
anonymization of Table IIII where k =
table
table

T:
p

T{

2) anonymized W.r.t.
w.r.t. individuals:
individuals: any query of the type
2)
nvip(v(JT*)) returns either zero tuples or at least k
IIvip(v(JT*»
distinct tuples,
tuples, and
distinct

3) correct:
correct: tuples
tuples in
in JT
JT and JT*
JT* can be ordered such that
3)
for all
all possible j,
j, JT*
JT* [attlij]
[att:l(j]isis equal to or some generfor
alization of JT[att][j]
JT[att]b]if att E QMR
QMn and JT*[att][j]
JT*[att]b]is
alization
JT[att][j] if att E SMR
SMn
equal to
to JT[att][j]
equal
The part'
part 'kk not necessarily distinct tuples' in requirement I1
The
can be changed to
to 'k
'k distinct tuples' if we assume all sensitive
sensitive
can
information in
in the
the M
M RR isis unique. M
M RR and the k-anonymous
information
MR* need not be structurally equivalent, however, we will
MR*

T';

see that equivalence eases the anonymization process
process and can
improve utility of the dataset.
example in
Table
I1
is clearly not
The
II
k-anonymous even for k
=
2, as Insid
IIIS id
( ~ ~ o u r s e = ' H i s t o r ~ f ~ ~ o o k = ' ~ m . H i s t ' ( JIT=
(acourse='History'flBook='Am,Hisu(JT»
=) ) II{S4}I
I{S4}1 =
= 1.
1.
Table 111
III shows a 2-anonymization
2-anonymization of
of Table I1
II using
generalizations from the domain generalization hierarchies
generalizations
given in Figure 1; the same query on Table 111
III returns no
tuples.
Theorem I:
R be a k-anonymous multiR database
Theorem
1: Let M R
where ST =
{TI, . . . ,, T
,} and k 2
= {Tl,'"
Tn}
:2: 2. Then for every vip
v p , there exist some ef 2
..
value vp,
:2: k-1
k-l distinct vip values vpl,
VPl, ..,.

4

G?
Science

anonymization for PT
PT in terms of classical k-anonymity
definitions.
We now define two operators that will be used in the
following sections for multiR databases:
MR I ,
Definition 6 (Union):
(Union): For structurally equivalent MR1,
I
2
2
u
u
MR and MRU,
MR , MRU
MR ¢=
MR U
MR if and only if PTU
PT u ==
MR'
+ MR1
u MR'
2).
PTTI ~UPT
P
u P T2~, (T
, jU E STU)
ST^) == (Tl
(T; E STI)
ST^) U
u (TJ
(T; E ST
ST').
I
2
MRII ¢=
MRR ~IIMR
Definition 7 (Concatenation):
(Concatenation): MRII
+M
MR'
I I if and
only if PTll
PTII =
PTl,
= ST
=P
T ~STII
,
S T ~I U{PT
U { P T2'}UST
) U S T2' , and vipll
uipll =
=
vipl
uipl
Many different cost metries
metrics were used in the literature [8],
[8],
[4], [15], [9]
[9] to measure utility of anonymized datasets. We
redefine two of these cost metrics, LM[8] and DM[4], for the
multiR setting, and use them in our experiments. Different
variations that may better fit to relational databases can be
formalized. (Discussion on such a formulation is beyond the
scope of this paper.) Algorithms in the coming sections are
independent of the cost metric being used and discussions
apply no matter what cost metric is being used.
Definition 8 (LM):
(LM):ff(v)
(u) be a function that given a categorical [continuous] data cell value vu returns the number
+1]
of distinct values [value interval +
I] that cell value stands
for, and g(att)
g(att) be a function that returns the number of
distinct values [value range +1] in from the domain of a given
att. Assuming g(att)
1,
[continuous] attribute att.
categorical [continuous]
g(att) > I,
the general loss metric for a multiR database M
R*
MR*

(T?

Fig.
Fig. 1.
1. Course, Book DGH
DGH structures
structures
figure

upe such that for every view vu possible if vp
up E lIuip(u(JT))
vp£
IIvip(v(JT))
upl, VP2,'"
up',. . . vp£
upe E lIvip(u(JT)).
Sup ==
then VPI,
IIvip(v(JT)). We say the set Svp
{vp,
{up,VPI,
upl, VP2,
up2, ...
. . . vpd
upe) is the equivalence class of vp
up and write
ECMR(VP)
E
C M R ( ~ P==) Svp.
Sup.
PROOF.
PROOF.Suppose this is not the case and let the set of
views Vvp
IIvip(Vi(JT)). Since there are no
Vup =
= {vilvp
{uilup E lIvip(ui(JT)).
common kk -- 1 vip values (other than vp)
up) over all views
IIvip(Vi(JT))1 < k. Constructing
then we have II nv,EVvp RuiP(ui(JT))I
n == nViEVvpVi
nu,Ev,,ui gives IlIVip(un(~T))I
5 kk and
the view vun
IIIvip(vn(JT)) I ::;
vp
the k-anonymity constraint.
up E rIIvip(Vn(JT)),
I u i p ( u n ( ~ ~violating
)),
This gives a contradiction. D

The MR database in Table III,
111, has two equivalence classes:
ECMR(Sl) =
{SI,S2}
{S1,S2) and {S3,S4}.
{S3,S4). (e.g., ECMR(S1)
= {Sl,S2})
{ S l ,5 2 ) )
Theorem 1 can be modified for only sensitive attributes if
we have unique sensitive values. Every sensitive value ss in
the data belongs to a set ECMR(s)
ECM R (s) of at least kk sensitive
values such that if s is in a query result then every element
C M R ( s )is also in that query result. (e.g., in Table III,
IU,
in E
ECMR(S)
E
CMR
~ ~(3.72)
( 3 . 7==2 {3.72,2.34})
{3.72,2.34))
)
EC
The k-anonymity definition for a multiR database is not
arbitrary. If an attacker faces
faces the same set of private entities in every possible set of queries, it can only map
its external knowledge to that set. Requirement 3 for kanonymity prevents false
false information being included in the
anonymization of the original database. (Otherwise there
k-anonymization such as repliwould be trivial solutions for k-anonymization
cation of tuples. This requirement holds also for classical, single-table k-anonymity, although it was not included
explicitly in its definition.) Note that the definitions and
concepts given here subsume the definitions of single-table kanonymity. In classical k-anonymity, we have one private table
PT(AI,'
An) without any dependencies corresponding to
P
T ( A 1 , ...
. . ,,A,)
a population U.
PT belongs to an
U . Since every tuple in PT
individual, we can add a unique identifier attribute to PT
PT to
(A,,u , Al
,. . . ,,A,).
form PTp
PTp(A
AI,'"
An). PTp becomes a person specific
table with vip attribute A,.
Au. In that case an anonymization
for M
MR({A
An}},U,
PTp, {},A
R ( { Auu -->
+ {AI,'"
{ A l , . . . , A,)),
U, PTp,
{), A,)
u ) is also an

L L
*'

£
'_

LM(MR*) = TESU qlEQITJ-I

L

-

f(T[qi][j]) - 1
g(qi) - 1

ITI·IQIrI

TESU*
TESU*
LM metric can be defined on individual data cells. It
penalizes the value of each data cell in the anonymized dataset
depending on how general it is (how many leaves are below
it on the DOH
(e.g.,, LM("Science")
LM("ScienceW) =
= f("Science")-1
DGH tree). (e.g.
g("Course")-1
LM for the multiR dataset normalizes the total cost to
get a number between 0 and I,
1.
R* be an anonymization of M R
Definition 9 (DM):
(DM): Let M
MR*
GMR*
(up)be the set of vips in M
MR*
and let G
M R* (vp)
R* indistinguishable
from a given vip vp
up E MR. Then

~'(~~~~::,'~:=

g)
t i)

DM(MR*)
D
M ( M R * ) ==

L
1

IGMR*(Vp)1
(GMR(up11
vpEMR
As in the LM metric, smaller the number returned by DM
anonymization.
metric, better the anonymization.

III.
111. Single
Single Table Algorithms
Algorithms for MuitiR
MultiR
Anonymity
We now explore some obvious approaches to achieving
multiR anonymity using single table k-anonymity algorithms.
The main idea is to convert the multiR database into one or
more single tables and anonymize these. For each approach,
we describe why it does not give satisfactory results; the

TABLE
TABLE V.
V. The universal
universal table for TT,p and
and Tl
T1 along
along with 2 anonymizations
anonymizations of it where kk == 2
table
table
Sid
SI
SI
SI
S2
S2
S2
S3
S3
S3
S4
S4

Course
Math
Physics
History
CS
Physics
Religion
History
Religion
Physics
History
Religion

GPA
3.72
3.72
3.72
2.34
2.34
2.34
3.12
3.12
3.12
4.00
4.00

I

Sid
SI
SI
SI
S2
S2
S2
S3
S3
S3
S4
S4

Course
Science
Science
History
Science
Physics
Religion
History
Religion
Physics
History
Religion

GPA
3.72
3.72
3.72
2.34
2.34
2.34
3.12
3.12
3.12
4.00
4.00

Sid
SI
SI

{SI,S4}

*

{S2,S3}
{S2,S4}
S3
S3
{S2,S3}
{SI,S4}
{S2,S4}

GPA
3.72
3.72
3.72
2.34
2.34
2.34
3.12
3.12
3.12
4.00
4.00

Course
Science
Science
History

*

Physics
Religion
Social
Social
Physics
History
Religion

JT

I

ATz

TABLE
TABLE VI. Local
Local anonymizations
anonymizations for TT,p and
and TTI1 where kk =
=2
table
table
Sid
SI
S2
S3
S4

Sid

{SI,S2}
{S I,S2}
{S3,S4}
{S3,S4}

GPA
3.72
2.34
3.12
4.00

Sid
SI
SI
SI
S2
S2
S2
S3
S3
S3
S4
S4

GPA
3.72
2.34
3.12
4.00

I
/

Course
Science
Science
History
Science
Physics
Religion
History
Religion
Physics
History
Religion

Sid
Sid
SI
SI
{SI,S4}

I

Course
Course

I Science
Scicncc 1
I Science
Science 1

Grade
Grade
93
91
91
85
78
62
42
85
75
75
77
98
96

m
i
I

History

*

{S2,S3}
{S2,S4}
{S2,S4)
S3
S3
s3
{S2,S3}
fS2.S3)
{SI,S4}
{S2,S4}

I

*

i
I

Physics
Religion
Social
Social
social
Physics
Phvsics
History
Religion

i

I

I

1 1

1
I

I

Sid
SI
SI
S1
SI
S2
S2
S2
S3
S3
S3

I

I

I

Course
Science
Physics
Physics
Social
Science
Physics
Social
History
Religion

I

/

I

mi
I

*

*

S4
S4

History
Religion

TABLE VII. Bitmap
Bitmap version of M R without some of the sensitive
sensitive attributes
attributes and
and its 2-anonymization,
2-anonymization,
attribute T
T in
in each
each course
course shows whether the student has
has taken
taken that course
course or not. This reduces
reduces the
info loss in
in the anonymization
anonymization to some
some degree
table
table
Sid

Math
Di
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

T
SI
S2
S3
S4
SI
S2
S3
S4

*
*

*
*

0
0

0
0

Physics
Ca Dyn
1
1
1
1
I
0
1
1
0
0
0
0

T

1
1

*
*

*
*
*
*

1
1
0
0

CS
Di
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0

T

*
*

*
*

0
0

0
0

T
I
0
1
1

*
*

1
1

History
RH Ot
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

Religion
Yo
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0

GPA
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0
0
0
1

T
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4.00

*
*

0
0

0
0

*
*

0
0

*
*

*
*

1
1

*
*
*
*

3.72
2.34
3.12
4.00
I
I,

I
I

insights are useful in understanding the algorithm we will
give in Section IV.

A. Universal
Universal Anonymization
Anonymization
One solution might be to construct the universal relation
from the multiR database and run a single-table anonymization algorithm on this relation. Table JT
J T in Table V
V shows the
universal table for the database M
R(SF, U,
MR(SF,
U,TTp,
{TI), Sid).
Sid).
p , {TI},
(the attribute SCid is removed but this does not affect the
discussion.) To run an anonymity algorithm,
algorithm, we need to
identify the attributes that need to be modified. We have two
choices at this point. The first approach is to modify only the
quasi-identifier attributes (attribute Course in JT)
J T ) leaving the
others untouched. Dataset ATl
ATI in Table V
V is one possible 2anonymization of JJT.
ATI obviously
T . However, we see that ATl
does not provide anonymity when an attacker knows all or
some of the courses taken by a student. E.g., if an attacker
knows that Chris is taking History, Math and Physics, then
it will map Chris to Sl
S1 since Sl
S1 is the only one taking two
science courses and a history course.
A second approach would be to modify join keys (NDGH
generalizations [15]) along with the quasi-identifiers (e.g.,
generalizations
V is
attributes Course and Sid in JT). Dataset AT2
AT2 in Table V
2-anonymization of JT,
J T , but still fails to satisfy privacy
such a 2-anonymization
constraints.
constraints.
The main reason anonymization of a universal relation
fails is that multiple tuples belong to a single person and
the anonymization process does not take this into account. It
becomes possible that tuples belonging to the same entity
are anonymized with each other, making the relation "kanonymous" but failing to protect individual identity.
identity. One
way of resolving this would be to suppress all the data in
the joining attributes (e.g., Sid). But in that case, the dataset
would lose its relational structure and the valuable information
in the I-N or N-N relations (e.g., the information that a
student taking Math, Physics and History has GPA 3.72 would
be lost). This universal approach also suffers from inference
channels due to the redundancy in representation when the
adversary knows functional dependencies
dependencies for the schema, e.g.,
+ GP
G P A holds, the attacker will discover
in AT2,
AT2, given Sid ---t
S1 since the first two tuples
the third tuple is actually Sid Sl
imply the student with GPA 2.71 is Sl.
S1. A related work
[21] worth mentioning here was on checking k-anonymity on
dataset. The work was not based on
views over a universal dataset.
table generalizations
generalizations and did not propose a k-anonymization
algorithm to create anonymous views.

B. Local Anonymization
Anonymization
Another way to anonymize the dataset would be to kanonymize each table independently. The most basic way of
T; and Tl
T: of Table VI. This set of
doing that is shown in TJ
tables suffers from the same problems mentioned in Section
III-A
111-A (e.g., disclosure of Chris's GPA.)

A second approach again would be to use NDGH general~
generalizations on non-QI join
join keys as shown in T;
T; and Tt.
T?. In this
case, for this particular
particular MR database, GPA information seems
to be 2-anonymous. However, sensitive Grade information
is not protected. The attacker will still be able to map S
S1I
to Chris and learn that he has received "93"
"93" and "91"
"91" in
two science courses (although not which course each score
belongs to.) This is a violation of anonymity requirement 2,
since Chris is not anonymous with respect to another student.
Another downside of the approach is that modifying join
join keys
introduces many incorrect join
join paths, decreasing the usability
of the data.
The main reason why local anonymizations fail is that
use of independent and arbitrary mappings for generalization
of one table can create inference channels with respect to
mappings used by other tables. A multiR anonymity algorithm
should use consistent mappings throughout datasets (e.g., by
Theorem 1;
S1 and S2 are anonymized with each other
1; if Sl
in one table, their courses should also be anonymized with
T; and T{
T? show
each other in the other table.) Tables T;
a valid 2-anonymization that enforces consistent mapping.
Anonymization should also decide which mapping to use for
anonymization. Clearly a multiR anonymity algorithm needs
to view data globally to come up with close mappings between
private entities while maintaining precision and usefulness of
the output data.
data. The multiR anonymity algorithm given in
Section IV will take all these observations into account and
give global decisions for anonymization mappings.
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C. Bitmap Anonymization
Some multiR databases can be converted to a boolean
"bitmap" format with every private entity as a single
vector "bitmap"
row, and distinct attributes used to reflect different values.
"1"
Bitmap conversion is done by assigning the value "I"
for attributes that the private entity possess in the MR
database. Handling the other attributes that the entity does
database.
not possess is done differently for different types of MR
databases, non-existing tuples in the
databases. In complete databases,
db (negative tuples) implies that the individual does not
possess the corresponding attribute. Thus non-existent
non-existent tuples
also constitute in the information content of the database.
Voters Database, ...
...
(e.g., University Registration Database, Voters
Tl of Table II,
11, S 1I taking "Religion"
"Religion" course is missing
In TI
"Religion" course.)
implying Chris definitely did not take the "Religion"
In bitmap versions of complete databases, "0"
"0" is used for
non-existent attributes of the entities. On the other hand,
in incomplete databases, negative tuples imply uncertainty
and they do not add into the information content. (e.g.,
hospital databases, business databases that share customers,
..." . Having a patient not having a particular disease in a
hospital database does not necessarily imply that patient did
not have the disease. It is always possible that full records
of a patient are contained in multiple hospitals.) In bitmap
versions of incomplete databases, value "*,,
"*" is used for non-

existent attributes of the entities to express uncertainty.
Table VII shows the bitmap version of the complete MR
I1 and its 2-anonymization.
2-anonymization. Classical
database given in Table II
k-anonymity algorithms can be run on such datasets. The
anonymized data will then satisfy both multiR anonymity
requirements for certain types of relations, however:
1) Not every multiR database is bitmap convertible.
1)
Schemas containing tables that map one entity to another
Schemas
entity an arbitrary number of times cannot be converted
loss. (E.g., a
to bitmap format without information loss.
student taking n different Physic classes where n is
arbitrarily large cannot be readily expressed. This is a
serious drawback for datasets that are updated frequently.
Updates on certain individuals can trigger changes in the
schema of the anonymized dataset.)
2) For incomplete databases, anonymization would only
be through suppression,
"S1 is taking
suppression, as generalizing "SI
course" into
a Math course and S2 is taking a CS course"
"S1I and S2 are both taking a Science course" would
"S
correspond to merging columns in the schema rather than
generalization of data. So anonymizations cannot take
generalization hierarchies or
advantage of user supplied generalization
total ordering assumptions for the attribute domains (for
the sake of both utilization and incorporating domain
knowledge).
3) For complete databases, anonymizations would additionally preserve common negative information (e.g.,
"S3 is not taking a CS course and S4 is not taking
"neither
a CS course", anonymization would preserve "neither
S3 nor S4 is taking a CS course") However it is still
S3
impossible to incorporate domain knowledge through
assumptions.
generalization hierarchies or total ordering assumptions.
(e.g., generalizing a student taking "CS"
"CS" with another
"Math" is as costly as generalizing two
student taking "Math"
"CS' and "Religion"
"Religion" respectively, even
students taking "CS"
though the former could be a better generalization.)
4) Suppression in the bitmap setting removes certainty
about the number of tuples corresponding to a given
entity. (e.g., "SI is taking a Math course and S2 is taking
"S1 and S2
a CS course" could safely be generalized into "SI
are both taking at least one ("Science")
("Science") course". Bitmap
anonymization would imply "S
"SlI and S2 are taking two
courses in total".)
total".)

similar5) Bitmap anonymizations do not consider possible similarities of two private entities in the tail of a nested relation.
(E.g., in the multiR database in Table II,
11, SI
S1 is taking a
(E.g.,
Math course, buys the Discrete book for the course and
S2 is taking" a CS course and buvs
buys the same book. Given
that course information is generalized (or suppressed),
the book information can safely be preserved without violating privacy. Bitmap anonymization would not retain
only the book information.)
6) Conversion to bitmap format produces datasets of high
dimensionality. Since distribution of produced data

thi~
points are skewed over the whole possible space, thig
does not introduce further problems regarding the curse
k-anonymity algorithms
algorithms do
of dimensionality. However, k-anonymity
not take into account the existence of 'invalid points'
points'
Math-T:O, Math-Di:1
Math-Di:l would be an
(e.g., a point with Math-T:O.
invalid point implying student has not taken 'Math'
'Math'
but used the 'Discrete' book for the 'Math'
'Math' course.
Heuristics would need to be used that would ignore
invalid
invalid points to speed up the anonymization.
anonymization.
7) Most real world data is stored as relational tables rather
than bitmap tables. Conversion to such a bitmap costs
additional execution time and storage,
storage, not to mention the
cost of converting applications designed for the original
schema.
schema.

8) Many real world relational databases contain correlations
8)
within relations and this may make certain heuristics
(e.g., a student taking
for improving efficiency possible. (e.g.,
a 'science'
'science' course is more likely to buy a 'science'
'science'
or 'math'
'math' book than a 'religion' book. It is possible
algorithms that
to design fast and reasonably precise algorithms
decide anonymizations only on courses without considering book information.) It may be difficult to exploit
such correlations without considering the structure of the
data. A single table k-anonymity algorithm on a bitmap
database will be unaware of the underlying structure and
thus the correlation.

IV. Clustering-based
Clustering-based MuitiR
MultiR Anonymity
We now develop a multiR anonymity algorithm that overcomes the shortcomings of the approaches described in the
previous section, although it places certain (reasonable) resupported. Algorithms for arbitrary
strictions on the schemas supported.
schemas are left as future work.

A. Assumptions and Properties
We aim to preserve certain properties of the database,
database, and
in doing so accept certain limitations on the databases that
can be anonymized by our algorithm. These properties and
assumptions are given here.
Preservation: The schemas of the input database
Schema Preservation:
MR
M R and the k-anonymous output MR* will be structurally
equivalent (Definition 4).
Preservation: The anonymized database preDependency Preservation:
serves functional
functional dependencies of the original database,
database, so
that:

1) the semantics of the data are better preserved, and
1)
2) inference attacks, by an adversary who knows a funcfunctional dependency that fails
jails to hold in the anonymized
data, are prevented.
We require that the schema be normalized to enforce dependencies; this obviates the need to provide dependencies
dependencies
separately as input to the anonymization algorithm.
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Snowflake
Snowflake Schema:
Schema: The algorithm we present is limited
following constraints:
constraints:
to schemas
schemas satisfying
satisfying the following
1)
1) No connection
connection keys (primary/foreign
(primarylforeign keys) between taquasi-identifiers. (It is possible
bles in MR are quasi-identifiers.
possible to replace
replace
quasi-identifiers with non-identifying keys to presuch quasi-identifiers
serve connections.)

2) Every table in 5T
S T contains
contains only one foreign
foreign key. Table
PT
P
T does not contain a foreign
foreign key.
3) We say a table T2 belongs to the family
family of Tl and write
T
F(T1) if T2
T2
T2 has a foreign key attribute
attribute which is a
2 E F(Tl)
Tl1 or in another family
family
primary key attribute either in T
TI. We restrict ourselves to schemas
schemas with
member of Tl.
F
( P T ) == ST.
F(PT)
5T.
Schemas with these constraints
constraints are similar to snowflake
snowflake
Schemas
PT
relations where the fact table is the table P
T (see Figure 2),
although we do support one to many relationships
relationships between
PT
PT and other tables. Any table in the schema can contain
contain
sensitive
sensitive attributes;
attributes; anonymity constraint 1 will hold for all of
them. This family
family of schemas
schemas is expressive
expressive enough for many
database applications (XML,
(XML, some spatio-temporal databases,
databases,
database
data warehouses,
warehouses, ...)
Atomicity: The algorithm presented in the
Join Key Atomicity:
next section will preserve the atomicity of join keys. (The
assumption that join keys are not quasi-identifiers
assumption
quasi-identifiers makes it
possible to follow this approach in all cases.) This ensures
ensures one
{T~,T?)
true join path as opposed to multiple paths (as in {Ti,
Tf}
of Table VI) in each connection and improves
improves utility of the
anonymization (a query on the anonymized dataset is "true",
"true",
in the sense that the result is a generalization of the result on
the underlying dataset.)
dataset.)

CLustEring
B. MultIRelAtional
Anonymization Algorithm

(MiRaClej
( ~ i ~ a ~ l e j

We now present a MiRaCle anonymization
anonymization algorithm
algorithm that
anonymizes a given multiR database under the assumptions
assumptions
given in the previous section. We first
first give a higher level
description of the algorithm to make the formal
description
formal explanation
explanation
easy to follow.
follow.
1)
I ) Informal Description: MiRaCle is a clustering-based
clustering-based
distance-based clustering
kanonymity algorithm;
algorithm; any distance-based
clustering kanonymity algorithm [5],
[5], [IS], [I]
[l] can be used as a basic
skeleton
skeleton for MiRaCle anonymizations. The main observation
observation
is that all clustering
clustering based anonymity algorithms
algorithms make use of
two basic operations
operations on private entities: anonymization
anonymization and
calculation
entities. The latter
calculation of the distance
distance between two entities.
can be generally defined
defined as the cost of the anonymization
of two entities.
entities. As an example basic skeleton,
skeleton, in the next
section,
section, we present a trivial modification of CDGH clustering
algorithm [15]
tum our attention
[15] for MiRaCle. Here we turn
attention to the
real question:
question: How to anonymize two entities?
The assumptions
assumptions given in the previous section enables us
to abstract entities of a multiR databases as trees where each
level of a given entity tree corresponds
corresponds to levels of the nested
example.)
relation for a particular vip entity.
entity. (Figure
(Figure 3 gives an example.)
The challenge
challenge is to anonymize
structure
anonymize two trees of similar structure
other.
with respect to each other.

Algorithm 1 anonymize(tree(sl),
anonymize(tree(sl), tree(s2)
tree(s2))
returns the tree rooted
Require: For a tree node s; tree(s) returns
s and Vs
us returns the QI attribute
attribute values associated
from sand
from
associated
vl and
with node s. For two values of the same domain VI
V2,
gen(VI, V2)
returns the lowest cost generalization
212, gen(vl,
v2) returns
generalization of
VI
vl and V2
vz w.r.t. a dgh.
dgh.
1:
gen( Vel' Vvc2)
I: vel
VC, ,VC2
vc2 == gen(vcl,
C2 )
2: let Cl
C1 be the set of child nodes of node SI
sl
3: let C2
C2 be the set of child nodes of node S2
s2
4: find a low cost pairing of nodes in C1
C2
C 1 and C2
5:
for all matching pairs of nodes (C1
(cl E Cl, C2
c2 E C2)
C2) do
5: for
6:
anonymize(tree(cl ), tree(c2)
tree(c2))
6:
anonymize(tree(cI),
7: for
U C2)
7:
for all nodes c E (C
(C11 u
C2) unmatched do
suppress every value in nodes of tree(c)
tree(c)
8:
suppress
l

anonymize two entity trees.
Algorithm 1 shows how to anonymize
trees.
Anonymization occurs
occurs top-down. First QI attributes
attributes for tree
roots are anonymized
other. Each tree root has
anonymized with each other.
a set of child nodes. (In Figure 3, children
children of 51
S1 and 52:
S2:
Cl ={"Math", "Physics",
"Physics", "History"},
"History"), C
C2={"CS",
"Physics",
Cl={"Math",
2 ={"CS", "Physics",
"Religion"}.)
pairings of nodes be"Religion").) The algorithm chooses pairings
tween these sets
sets to minimize
current
minimize the local cost in the current
level or the overall cost of the anonymized
anonymized trees. (In Figure
3, "Math" is paired with "CS",
"CS", "Physics"
"Physics" with "Physics",
"Physics",
producing the set of nodes
and "History"
"History" with "Religion",
"Religion", producing
{"Science",
{"Science", "Physics", "Social"}
"Social") which is the least costly set
in terms of the cost metric used (e.g., LM.) Since each pair
is composed of two trees to be anonymized
anonymized and function
function is
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3. Anonymization
Anonymization of students
students 81
S1 and
and 82
S2
from
from the
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example MR database
database in
in Table
Table IIII
figure
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MiRaCle(MR , k, th, climit, anon, dist, cost) ''9
Algorithm 2 MiRaCle(MR,
Require: An input database MR with SST
= {TI,.
{T1 ,· .... ,,Tn},
Require:
T=
T,), k
constraint, a threshold value th, a cluster limit climit;
constraint,
anonymization function
function anon that can anonymize two
an anonymization
private entities;
of
a distance function dist that can calculate the distance of
two private entities;
function cost defined over anonymized MR
a cost metric function
databases;
databases;
of clusters C.
G. vip v,,
vc , is the
We begin with an empty set of
of cluster ci,
Ci, MR,,
MR c , is the database
cluster representative of
that contains v,,
Vc, and EC,,
EGci holds the set of
of private entities
Ci .
•
in c,
MR' is a k-anonymization
k-anonymization of
of MR
Ensure: MR*
1:
MR' ++- null
I: MR*
Vj in PT do
2: for all vip value vj
3:
if
G is empty then
if C
4:
4:
go to line 7
5:
S.t. di
di =
= dist(vj,
dist(Vj, v,,
VCi ,, MR, MR,,
MR ci )) is minimum
5: find ii s.t.
6:
(d; > th) A
/\ ((IGI
~ climit) then
6: if
if (4
( C (5
7:
Cnew, set cluster representative
representative
make a new cluster cn,,,
Vcnew = Vj, MR cnew
EGci = {Vj}

=

MR, G

=

G U {c new },

8:
8:
9:
9:
10:
10:
11:
11:

called on the
the subtrees.
subtrees. (In Figure 3, a second call is made
on
on (tree("Math"),
(tree("Math"), tree("CS"».
tree("CSn)). "Math" and "CS"
"CS" values are
changed to
to "Science"
"Science" as
as a result of the second call.
call . Unpaired
nodes
"Calc.")
nodes are
are suppressed (e.g., node "Calc.")

2) Formal Description: We first
first show in Algorithm 2 how
2)
to modify the
the CDGH clustering algorithm [15] to anonymize
to
database. Each cluster has a representative
representative
given multiR database.
a given
holds the
the anonymization of the entities it contains.
contains. For
that holds
vip value v, the algorithm finds,
finds, in line 5,
5, a suitable
each vip
cluster to
to put vv into. Suitability is measured by a distance
function dist
dist which we will define shortly.
shortly. If there is no
function
suitable cluster, in line
line 7.
7. vv defines a new one.
one. Then in line
suitable
9, the
the cluster representative
representative of the closest cluster is updated
9,
to be the
the anonymization of vv and the former representative
to
the function anon. When a cluster is full, the
by calling the
identifying information in the tuples in the cluster (including
identifying
to in other tables) is replaced with the cluster
tuples linked to
representative; these generalized tuples are placed into the
representative;
deleted. In lines 1313anonymized database and the cluster is deleted.
20, leftover clusters
clusters are
are combined. Leftover tuples in the last
20,
cluster «
(< k)
k) are
are suppressed.
suppressed.
As also
also mentioned in the previous section, the real chalAs
lenge isis to
to define
define the distance
distance between the two points (e.g.,
lenge
such as
as students). If we know how to produce
private entities such
anonymizations of two
two points with respect to each other,
anonymizations
we can derive the distance between them by calculating the
we
cost of their anonymization w.r.t. any precision/cost metric.
cost
Here are
are formal
formal details regarding how MiRaCle defines the
Here
anonymization and distance
distance functions
functions between two private
vl E MR
MR'I and V2
v2 E MR
MR':2 :
(vips) VI
entities (vips)

go to step 2 to process the next vip in MR
MR ci =
= anon(v,,,
anon(vc.,vj,MRc;,MR).
MR,,
vj, MRc,, MR).
EG
E
C ci
c , ==EEG
C cci, UU{ {vVj}
j)
if the number of
of elements in c"
Ci becomes more than k
then
12:
MR*
12:
MR' =
= MR*
MR' U
U MR,,;
MR c,; C
G=
=C
G- c,
Ci (remove Q)
Ci)
Ci left in C
G do
13:
13: for all cluster c+
14: find jj #
14:
=- ii s.t.
S.t. d,
di =
= dist(v,.,
dist(vCi.' v,,,
vc" MRcj,
MRcj , MR,,)
MR c.) is min.
15: MR,,
v,, ,' MA,,
).
15:
MRc; =
- anon(vc,,
anon(vc"vCj
MH c", MR,,
MRc;J.
EC,,
16:
EGc, =
= EC,,
EGci U
U EC,,
EGcj ; C
G=
= CG -- c,Cj (remove cj)
Cj)
16:
if the number of
17: if
17:
of elements in c,
Ci becomes more than k
then
C
) ; MR'
18:
G=
=C
G- c+
Ci (remove G
Ci);
MR' =
= MR*
MR' U
U MR,,
MR c,
18:
19: else
19:
j.
20:
go to line 14 to find another suitable j.
21: MR*
MR' now contains only one vip vi
Vi data for each equivalence
class, add the anonymizations
anonymizations for other vips by using EC,,
EGcj
sets created in the process.
22: suppress
suppress the remaining vips in C
G and add to MR*
MR'
23: return MR*
MR'

2
anon(Vl,V2,MR\MR ) =
Anonymize(O"vipl=Vl PT
2
dist(Vl,V2,MR\MR ) =
cost( anon(vl, V2, MR

1

,

1
,

O"Vi p2=V2 PT2 , MR

1
,

2
MR )

2
MR ))

For each entity in the input M R db, MiRaCle makes
one call to function Anonymize per cluster representative.
representative.
of cluster representative is bounded
bounded by the
Since the number of
input parameter
O(climit·
parameter climit, MiRaCle calls Anonymize O(c1imit.
I M R ( ) times. The efficiency of
1MRI)
of the algorithm depends on the
efficiency of the Anonymize function.
Function ""Anonymize(tl,
~ n o n ~ m i z e (tt2' ,, tM
~ ,R ~M
, R2~)") " produces an
MRl,
MR
TI ~and t2
T 22 .. (ti
anonymization for two tuples t1
PT
t 2 E pPT
(t i
tl E P

2, MR',
Anonymize(t l , tt2.
MR 1 , MR2)
MR 2)
Algorithm 3 ~nonvmizeftl,
i
Require: Tuple
t belongs to table pPT;.
MRRi ~are strucRequire:
Tuple ti
T i . All M
gen (Vl , V2)
v2) returns the common
turally equivalent, Function gen(v1,
structure of the associated
vl, V2
v2 on the dgh structure
associated
parent of values Vl,
domain.
domain.
2
Ensure:
MR' is an anonymization of tt1l and t 2
Ensure: MR*
1:
I: T'
T*¢=
e NULL
MR' be a database
2: Let MR*
database with transcript (.,.,
(., .,T',
T*, {), vipl)
3: for all atti
att, of P
T 1l do
3:
PT
if att;
atti is a QI attribute
attribute then {Just anonymize}
anonymize)
4:
if
4:
5:
5:
T'
[attil [1] ¢=
gen(t l [att,],
[atti], t2[atti])
t 2[attiJ)
T'[atti:l[l]
e gen(tl
6:
if
foreign key then {Copy}
if atti is a non-QI non-key or a foreign
{Copy)
7:
T'[attil[l]
T * [attil[l] ¢=
e tl[atti];
t1 [atti];
another table then
8:
8: if atti is a primary key for a join with another
{Ensure
join}
{Ensure anonymized across
across join)
l
for all pairs of tables
T i , T'f
Tk2in MR',
9:
for
tables Tl;,
MR , MR'
MR 2 where atti
9:
is a foreign
foreign key do
J0:
MRj, be the database
database with transcript
10:
Let MR3,
{., .,Tk,
Ti,F
( T ~ ) ,att;}
atti)
{.,.,
F(Tk),
11:
MR*
e MR*lI
(uatti=t~(attil~i.
11:
MR' ¢=
MR"I AnonymizeSets (aatti=tl[att<lTl;,
MRL
MR%)
aatti=t2[attiIT'f,
~ ~ t t ~ = t z [ ~ t MRk,
t ~ ~ T MR:)
kZ~
12:
T'[att
tl[atti]
12:
T*[attil[ll
e tl[atti]
i ][l] ¢=
13:
MR'
13: return MR'
-

n,

Algorithm 4 ~
n o n ~ r n i z e ~ e t ls ( =
C ' {tLt§,
{ti, t i , .... ·tin},
. t k ) , C 22 =
AnonymizeSets(C
=
2
{t:',t;,
.
.
.t;),
MR',
M
R
~
)
{ti, t~, ... t;'}, MRl, MR )
Require:
PT i . All M
MRRi ~are
Require: Sets of tuples
tuples C
Cii belongs to tables PT'.
structurally equivalent.
m 5
~ n
structurally
equivalent. 1 ~ m
Ensure:
MR' is a painvise
pairwise anonymization
Ensure: MR*
anonymization of C
C1l and C 22
1: Let MR*
MR' be an empty database,
database, structurally eq. to MRZ.
MR t .
E C1
C l do
2: for
for all t}
ti E
2
3: for all tJ
t: E
3:
E C 2 do
4:
tempMRj
Anonymize(t}, tJ,
MR l , MR2)
MR 2)
4:
tempMRj ¢=
e Anonymize(t:,
t:, MR1,
5:
costMRj ¢=
e cost(tempMRj)
5:
6: minCostj ¢=
e arg min
wstMRj
6:
mint. <;ostMRj
MR*
e MR*
t e m p ~RminCostj
~mincostj
7:
MR' ¢=
MR' U
u
tempM
8:
- tminCostj
8: C 22 ¢=
-+CC22 tmincostj
9:
PT'
9: Suppress
Suppress rest of the tuples in C
C22 and add them to P
T*
10:
MR'
10: return MR*

<

10

matching depends on the effect of the generalization
on all of the connected tables (This is ensured by
recursive calls to the anonymization function in Line 4.)
Anonymize matched tuples with each other, suppressing
any unmatched tuples.

2
, and assuming n =
Given sets of tuples C
C'l and C
C2,
= IC
Ic' 1 ,1 ==
IC 1 there are O(n!) possible pairwise matchings. It is costly
IC21
to search such a big space to find a cost optimal matching.
anonymizeSets uses the following
Because of this, algorithm anonymizesets
C1l is matched optimally
matching heuristic. Each node in C
with a node in C 22 one by one. (e.g., t i is matched with a
2
, then t§
tuple in C
C2,
t i is matched with another, ...
. . . ) This way
pairwise matchings.
0 ( n 22 )) painvise
complexity reduces to O(n
The algorithm can use any incremental cost metric that can
be defined on a database. For the experiments, we will use
11.
the LM metric defined in Section II.
Table 111
III shows the output of MiRaCle on the MR input
= 2. vip S
S11 and S2, and vip S3
S3
given in Table I1
II for k =
and S4 anonymized with each other. Figure 3 shows how
S1 and S2 are anonymized.
anonymized. The algorithm first ensures the
Sl
Tpp does not
tuples are anonymous w.r.t. QI attributes. Since T
contain any QI attributes, no change is done (the root nodes
in Figure 3). However, the primary key of T
Tp,
p , Sid, occurs in
Tl as a foreign key, so algorithm AnonymizeSets is called on
the sets of tuples usid=~~sl~/Ti
~ ~ ~ = ~(the
~ ~nodes
~ , , T I
asid="Sl"Tl and au sid="S2"Tl
on the second level of the trees). A one-to-one matching of
tuples is done according to how costly the anonymization
of the matched tuples will be. Anonymization in this level
also takes into account table T2
T2 (Books table), since T2
T2 and
C i d as a joining
"Math" node is
Tl share S
SCid
joining key. First, the "Math"
"CS" node since they can be anonymized
matched with the "CS"
as "Science"
"Science" and they have a common node in the third level
(in table T2).
Tz). The "Physics"
"Physics" node is matched with "Physics",
"Physics",
the anonymization here triggers a call of AnonymizeSets on
the sets of nodes {"Calc",
{"Calc", "Dyn"}
"Dyn") and {"Dyn"}.
{"Dyn"). Node "Dyn"
"Dyn"
is matched with node "Dyn".
"Dyn". No match is found for the node
"Calc"
The last nodes in the second level
"Calc" so it is suppressed.
.
are anonymized similarly.
If we take the function gen as the basic operation, function
anonymize (and thus the algorithm MiRaCle) turns out to
= lC1l
= IC21,
be expensive. Assuming n =
ICll =
IC 2 1, for every call
2
2
anonymizesets(C1, C
c 2 ,.,
, ., .),
.), O(n
0 ( n 2 ) generalizations are
to anonymizeSets(Cl,
performed. Note that the anonymize function (thus function
anonymizeSets) is recursively called for every level in the
relation (roughly speaking for every table in the MR dataR,, complexity
base). Given that we have f.[ levels (tables) in M R
j(f.) == n 22 .. fj(f.
- 1). This gives us a
(e function is defined as f(e)
2i ) for function anonymize. So MiRaCle
0(nZe)
complexity of O(n
2i
is an O(climit
O(c1imit . 1MRI
lMRl . nnZe)
) algorithm.
2

d

-

may be considered as a root node of a tree structure stored
in database M
MRRi ~, e.g.,
,
Figure 3) The function classifies and
processes each attribute one by one. Processing of primary
key attributes is important since they serve as connections
to other tables. Attribute evaluation can be summarized as
follows:
follows:
• Lines 4-7: for non-key attributes and foreign key attributes, behave as in single table anonymity: anonymize
QI attributes w.r.t. dgh structures, leave the rest (sensitive
attributes and foreign keys) as they are.
• Lines 8-12: for a primary key attribute att, find all pairs
of tables (Ti
(T~ E ST~,T;
STl,Tf E ST'
ST)2 ) where att is a foreign
C1l =
= {d,
{ti,....
. . , tk)
key. We will have two sets of tuples C
tA}
2
and C 2 == {tI,'"
{t:, . . . ,,t;,}
t&) in T
T~i and T: respectively where
2 [att]. Call
each t{[att]
tt[att] = tl[att]
tl[att] and each t:[att]
t~[att] =
= tt2[att].
2
"anonymizeSets(Cl,
"anonymize~ets(C1,C
C2,,.,.,
., ., .)"
.))' to find suitable one-toone matchings between tf s and tis. Suitability of a given

Tf

tts

t;s.

C. MiRaCle Extension:
Extension: MiRaCleX
As mentioned in the previous sections, a multiR
anonymization algorithm can make use of the relational
structure of the database to come up with more efficient

heuristics. We present one example of such a heuristic in this
section.
The MiRaCle anonymization process given in Section IVB.2 considers the whole sibling subtrees when deciding on a
suitable matching of sibling nodes. (in other words, subtree
matching is done rather than node matching.) This is an
effective way of achieving an anonymization with maximum
precision. However, it is costly in terms of execution time
since the Anonymize function has to be called for each
potentially matched subtree pair (even for pairs that are not
matched at the end of the anonymization process).
MiRaCle extension, MiRaCleX, makes use of the followIf Q/
QI values for two root nodes are similal;
ing observation: If
similar,
then Q/
QI values for their children are likely to be similar too.
(If two students are both taking "Math" course, it is probable
that they are both using a "Math" book.) This observation
databases. (The tail
can be generalized for most relational databases.
of the relations is correlated with the root of the relation.)
An algorithm may produce anonymizations with reasonable
precision much faster by just
just looking at the QI attribute
similarities of the upper level nodes of the relation and not
considering lower level nodes. Given this, pairing of sibling
nodes in the AnonymizeSets function of MiRaCleX can be
rewritten as in Algorithm 5. By this, the recursive call to
the Anonymize function is moved outside of the innermost
and the complexity function for function anonymize
loop and,
(e) == n·
n . ff(e
(e -1)
- 1)+n
+ n2.2 • This gives us a complexity
becomes ff(e)
1
O(ne+')) for function anonymize. So MiRaCleX is an
of O(nl+
O(climit ·IMR\·
. I M R ( . nl+
ne+')1 ) algorithm.
O(cJ.imit
3,
to
find
a
matching
In
Figure
be{"~ath","~h~sics~","~istory")
tween
{"Math","Physics1","History"}
and
{"CS","Physics
level, MiRaCleX
{ " ~ ~ " , " ~ h ~ s2i","Religion"}
c s ~ " , " ~ e l i ~ini othe
n "second
)
Anonymize
Anonymize function only considers QI attributes in the Course
TI, ignoring information in the Books table T2.
T2. Once
table Tl,
" ~ h ~ s i c1s" ' "
matching is done on the second level (e.g., "Physics
2
to "Physics
,,), QI attributes in the Books table specify
"Physics2"),
the matching on the third level (e.g., a matching between
{"Calc","Dyn"}
{"Calc","Dyn") and {"Dyn"}).
{"Dyn")).

k-Anonymity for MiRaCle
MiRaCle AnonymizaAnonymizaD. Proof of k-Anonymity
tion
Algorithm
t i o n Algorithm
Now we prove that MiRaCle produces k-anonymous databases'.2 • Since the algorithm preserves the structure of the
bases
data and all changes are based on either generalizations or
suppressions, the third requirement for k-anonymity trivially
holds. The following theorems prove the first requirement
(sensitive information protection). The proof for the second
requirement is similar. Since k-anonymity ensures total protection against sensitive information disclosure only when
sensitive information is unique for every tuple, throughout the
proof, we assume such constraint is enforced in the dataset
and prove sensitive information is k-anonymous in the output
2
Discussion also
2~iscussion

applies for MiRaCleX

1

II

2
Algorithm
Algorithm 5 AnonymizeSetsX(C
~ n o n ~ m i z e ~ el t ==
s ~{tL
{ti,
( ~ tt~,
' i , ....
. .t m
k }},, C
c2
lt?,tZ..
. . t~},
t ? ~M
. R ~M
. R2 )~ )
{ti
,t~" ..
MRl,
MR
Require: Sets of tuples C
cii belongs to tables P
. M
Require:
PTTi .~All
MRRi ~are
structurally
< m :S5 n
structurally equivalent. 11 :S
1
Ensure:
MR' is a painvise
pairwise anonymization of C
and C 22
Ensure: MR*
c1
1: let MR*
MR' be an empty database,
MR i .
database, structurally
structurally eq. to MR'.
for all t}
t: EE C
C11 do
2: for
3:
3:
for
for all t: EE C 22 do
4:
for
for all attribute
attribute att
a t t of t}
t: do
QII attribute
attribute then
5:
if att is a Q
6:
t; [att]
[att] ¢=
-+ gen(t!
[att],t;
t?[att])
6:
tj
gen(tHatt],
[att])

t;

7:
7:
8:
8:

9:
9:

10:
10:
11:
11:
12:
12:
13:
13:
14:
14:

else
t; [att]
[att] ¢=
-+ tHatt]
t: [att]
tj
minCostj ¢=
-+ argmin
argrninjj cost(tj)
cost(t;)
-+ Anonymize(t:,
tkinCostj, MR',
tempMR ¢=
Anonymize(t}, t;'inCostj,
MR 1 , MR2)
MR 2 )
MR' ¢=
MR' UtempMR
MR*
-+ MR*
U tempMR
2
2
C
¢=
c2
-+ C
C2 -- t;'inCostj
tLinCostj
2
suppress rest of the tuples in C
c2
T*
suppress
and add them to P
PT'
return MR*
MR'

dataset. We assume the schemas satisfy the assumptions given
dataset.
IV-A.
in Section IV-A.
We start by showing that anonymization of two private
entities is correctly carried out by the function Anonymize.
Anonymize.
The function Anonymize given in Algorithm 3 produces one
representation of the anonymization as opposed to multiple
copies of it. For each equivalence class, copies are produced
from the representation at the end of MiRaCle given in
2. It is trivial to modify the function Anonymize to
Algorithm 2.
output the necessary copies. The proofs below will assume
copies exist in the Anonymize output. Since the algorithm
structure is recursive, we first prove the base case:
Lemma 2: Let MR1
MRR2 ~have structurally equivaMR 1 and M
i
ST^ == {). Let ttii be a tuple in PPTTi~. .
lent schemas with ST
2
Then function "Anonymize(t
MR 1 , MR2)"
MR 2 )" produces a 2" ~ n o n ~ m i z e1(, tt2,
l , MR',
2
1
anonymization for the tuples tt1 and tt2..

n.

PROOF.Since there are no tables connected to P
T ~i , ,
PROOF.
PT
Anonymize
Anonymize only applies basic generalizations to QI attributes
of ttii as in the single table k-anonymization process. This
ensures each QI in the two anonymized tuples is the same.
Therefore any subset of the QI occurs in at least two tuples;
with no links to other tables, 2-anonymity holds.
holds.33 0
We now prove, in a bottom up fashion,
fashion, the recursive step
to prove that k-anonymity property is propagated through
connected tables: If we take a set of k-anonymous databases,
and add another k-anonymous table where the join keys for
each set of private entities join (only) with an equivalence
class in the table, and vice-versa, then the combined set of
tables is k-anonymous.
MR 1 , .. ..
MR i , ...
MR t be t structurally
. . ,, MRi,
. . . ,, MRt
Lemma 3: Let MR',
equivalent k-anonymous databases with set of sensitive atS, QI attributes Q =
= {qil,'"
{qil,. . . ,,qid
qil) and a common
tributes S,
3The
behaves exactly like CDGH anonymization algorithm
3 ~ h algorithm
e
behaves
[I51 in this case.
[15]

,

1

~
case, we
we have
have (pr2
(pri. =
= p,
p,attl
..., =
= al
a1...
., m , ss =
= ss f)) E T
T an
and
vip
case,
attl ...m
vip attribute
attribute vip.
vip. Suppose
Suppose PTis
P T ~ Scontain
contain aa key pri. Let
a is
a . Since MR
(vip =
= v,pri
v,pri =
= p,
p,qi
= ql
q1...e)
...e) E JT
JTa.
MRa
is
ECMR'
(pri') returns
qill...e
...e =
(vip
ECMRi(pri')
returns the
the set of
o f pri values
values that
that belong
belong to
to
a
i . Also
= vj,pri
vj,pri =
= Pj,
pj, qi
qil...e
= ql ...
...e)
JTa
k-anonymous, (vip
(vip =
the
k-anonymous,
e) E JT
the equivalence
equivalence class
class of
of the
the pri value
value pri'
pri' in
in MR
MRi.
l ... e =
also holds,
holds, for
for every
every Pj
pj E ECMR(P).
ECMR(p).By the
the definition
definition of
of
suppose for
also
for any
any value
value pri', ECMRa(pri')
ECMRa(pri') == ECMRb(pri')
ECMRb( ~ r i 'if
if)
pri' EE PTa,
T , (pri
(pri =
= Pj,
pj, ss =
= Sj,
sj,att
. . .m
, =
= al
a1...
),. m ) EE TT holds
holds for
for same
same
T,
attll ...
P T a ,PT
P Tb .~That
That
. means
means equivalence
equivalenceclasses
classes of
of attribute
attribute
pjs
distinct Sj.
sj. Again we
we will have,
have, (vip
(vip == vj,pri
v j , ~ ==
i
pri are
are the
the same
same in
in all MR
M Ri .~ Let
. ECMR(pri')
~ ~ ~ ~ return
return
( ~ this
this
r i ' PjS
) and distinct
universal
universal equivalence
equivalence class
class of
o f pri'.
Pj,
·m , qil
...e =
pj, attl ..·
.., m =
= al
a1.....,,q
il...e
= ql ...e,
...e,Ss =
= Sj)
s j ) EE JT and Sj
sj EE
Let M
R TOOt be
MRToot
be another
another k-anonymous
k-anonymous db
db with
with
IIs(Q(JT)).
ns(Q(JT)). 0
transcript
transcript (.,.,
(., .,T,
T ,{},pri).
{),pri). Suppose
Suppose TT has
has attributes
attributes
2 have
Theorem
Theorem 4:
4: Let MR
MR1I and MR
MR2
have structurally
structurally equivaequiva(pri,
(pi, attI,'
attl, .... . ,,att
attm,
senl, . . . ,,senn).
senn). By definition
definition pri
m , senI,'"
i
ST
== {T{,
...
,
TA}
and
tuple
tiE
PT
lent
schemas
with
ST^
{T!,
.
.
.
,T:}
tuple
ti
E
P Ti .~ .
lent
schemas
with
is
attis are
are QI attributes
attributes ,, and senjs
senjs
is the
the primary key,
key, attis
I , MR
2 )" produces 2le, t(t22
Then
function
"Anonymize(t
,
MR
Then
function
"
~
n
o
n
~
m
i
z
t
l
,
,
MR1,
MR2)"
2are
are sensitive
sensitive attributes.
attributes. (Note
(Note that
that TT should
should be
be also
also kkl1 and tt2
2 in
in
some
MultiR
db
anonymization
for
the
tuples
anonymization
for
the
tuples
t
some
MultiR
db
anonymous.)
anonymous.) and also
also suppose
suppose ECT(pri')
~ C ~ ( p r i==' )ECMR(pri')
~ C ~ ~ ( p r i ' )
MR'.
MR*.
for
for every
every possible pd'.
pri'. Then
Then MR
MR == MRTootll(Ui
MRToot1 l(Ui MR
M R ii )) isis
also
also k-anonymous.
k-anonymous.
PROOF.
PROOF.Without
Without loss
loss of
of generality,
generality, suppose
suppose only
only T{s
T ~didiS
rectly
P T ~ SIn
In
. Lines
Lines 4-7, the
the algorithm
algorithm first
first
rectly joins with
with PTis.
2
As
an
3,
an example
example for
for Lemma
3, in
in TaTawith each
each other.
other. This
This provides 22generalizes tt l1 and tt2
with
generalizes
l
2 locally
ble
111,
MR1={.,.,a~ourse=~~~ciencell~i>
ble
III,
MRI={.,.,crCouTse="Science"Ti,
anonymity
locally in
in PT'.
PT*. (If
( I f we
we create
create aa
anonymity for
for tt 1 and tt2
l
{crSCid=SCIVSCid=SC4T5},
MR
and t 22, , itit will refer
MR db
db for
for the
the anonymous
anonymous tt1
refer to
to the
the
{ ~ s c ~ ~ = s c ~ v s c ~ ~SCid},
SCid),
=sc~T~*),
2
TOOt
MR2={.,.,acourse=ll~hysicsll~;,
M
R ={ o,o,O'Course= "Physics"Tt,
2-anonymous
2-anonymous MR
MRroot in
in Lemma 3.) Next,
Next, in
in line
line 44 of
o f the
the
{crSCid=SC2VSCid=Sc
{ascid=sc2vscid=scsT~},
SCid). The
The pri attribute
attribute
anonymizeSets algorithm,
algorithm,the
the anonymization
anonymizationfunction
function isis called
anonymizeSets
sTn, SCid}.
MRroot
above corresponds
corresponds to
to the
the attribute
attribute Sid
Sid and M
R TOOt ==
above
on
on each
each pair of
o f their
their connections
connections in
in Tl
T: and Tf.
T:. (Databases
(Databases
a
{.,.,
{., . ,T;,
T ' ,{},
0 ,Sid}.
Sid).
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from these
these calls
calls correspond
correspond to
to 2-anonymous
2-anonymous MR
MRa
returned
databases
of
3.)
anonymous
dbs
are
first
databases
of
Lemma
3.)
Returned
anonymous
dbs
are
first
PROOF.
PROOF.Suppose
Suppose this
this isis not
not the
the case
case and there
there exists
exists aa
o f anonymizeSets
anonymizeSets and then
then concatenated
concatenated with
with
in line
line 77 of
merged in
query
query Q
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on the
the join JT where
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< IIIs(Q(JT))
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for
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tuples
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3.
(MR*
II
as
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the
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some
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attribute either
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in table
table
some sensitive
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operations are
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propagated through
through
M
T.
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case separately.
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and T: joined
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the
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Now suppose
suppose s'
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MRa
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every Pj
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sj. By
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definition of
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a1...
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Theorem 5:
5: MiRaCle,
MiRaCle, when
when given
given an
an input
input database
database MR
MR
Theorem
and appropriate
appropriate parameters,
parameters, produces
produces aa k-anonymous
k-anonymous datadataand
base
base MR'.
MR*.
PROOF.The
The
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of
MiRaCle
PROOF.
skeleton
of
MiRaCle
isis
aa
clustering-based
k-anonymity
algorithm.
The
The
clustering-based
k-anonymity
algorithm.
only change
change MiRaCle
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call
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2)
A n o n y m i ~ creVipl=Vl
( a , , ~ ~PT
PT',
z =I~, ~
P T2 ,~MR
MR1,
, I , MR
MR2)
Anonymize(
cravip2=vz
Vi p2=V2 PT
lines 99 and
and 15
15 for
for the
the anonymization
anonymization of
of two
two private
private trees
trees
lines
vl and
and V2.
vg. Here
Here each
each private
private tree
tree isis actually
actually
rooted at
at VI
rooted
cluster representative
representative for
for multiple
multiple trees.
trees. Nodes
Nodes in
in each
each
aa cluster
representative tree
tree may
may have
have values
values from
from higher
higher domains
domains
representative
in the
the given
given dgh
dgh structure
structure (values
(values such
such as
as "Science",
"Science",
in
"Social"). However,
However, such
such difference
difference does
does not
not have
have any
any
"Social").
effect on
on the
the execution
execution of
o f the
the anonymize
anonymize function
function since
since
effect
the generalization
generalization function
function gen
gen isis well-defined
well-defined also
also
the
on higher
higher domains
domains (gen("Science","Math")="Science").
(gen("Science","Math")="Science").
on
The M
MR*
database returned
returned by
by the
the anonymization
anonymization
The
R' database
function will
will still
still be
be anonymous
anonymous with
with respect
respect to
to both
both
function
I and
2 are
trees. Specifically
Specifically ifif VI
vl EE MR
MR1
and V2
v2 EE MR
MR2
are mm
trees.
and nn anonymous
anonymous vip
vip representations
representations respectively
respectively then
then
and
vg EE MR'=anonymize(vl,v2,MRl,MR
MR*=anonymize(vl,v2, MR1, M R2 )~ )isis an
an m+n
m
n
V3
anonymous representation.
representation. At
At the
the end
end of
of the
the MiRaCle
MiRaCle
anonymous
has more
more than
than kk elements
elements and
and
algorithm, every
every cluster
cluster CC has
algorithm,
the associated
associated cluster
cluster representative
representative Vc
uc isis aa ICI-anonymous
ICI-anonymous
the
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7. OM
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cost for
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complete data
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figure
figure

figure
figure

representative.
representative. va
v~ for
for each
each C
C isis reproduced
reproduced for
for every
every
C (so
(so that
that they
they form
form an
an equivalence
equivalence class).
class).
entity within
within C
entity
This
This ensures
ensures k-anonymity.
k-anonymity. So
So Theorem
Theorem 44 also
also implies
implies the
the
correctness
correctness of
of Theorem
Theorem 5.
5. D

anonymizations, we
we used
used the
the adaptations
adaptations of
of the
the LM
LM and
and DM
DM
anonymizations,
11.
cost metrics
metrics defined
defined in
in Section
Section II.
cost
To observe
observe how
how MiRaCle
MiRaCle and
and MiRaCleX
MiRaCleX algorithms
algorithms adadTo
and 55 of
of Section
Section III-C,
111-C,
dress weaknesses
weaknesses given
given in
in items
items 22 and
dress
we first
first assumed
assumed that
that the
the dataset
dataset isis incomplete
incomplete as
as described
described
we
111-C. In
In Figure
Figure 4,
4, we
we graph
graph the
the change
change in
in LM
LM
in Section
Section III-C.
in
costs of
of three
three anonymizations
anonymizations with
with respect
respect to
to different
different k.
k.
costs
Both MiRaCle
MiRaCle and
and MiRaCleX
MiRaCleX are
are 30-40%
30-40% less
less costly
costly than
than
Both
Bitmap algorithm.
algorithm. Figure
Figure 55 supports
supports the
the same
same relation
relation
the Bitmap
the
50 but
but with
with varying
varying threshold
threshold (clustering
(clustering
for aa fixed
fixed kk == 50
for
shows the
the DM
DM costs
costs for
for the
the
input parameter).
parameter). Figure
Figure 66 shows
input
algorithms. MiRaCle
MiRaCle and
and MiRaCleX
MiRaCleX slightly
slightly outperform
outperform the
the
algorithms.
Bitmap algorithm
algorithm on
on the
the DM
DM metric.
metric.
Bitmap
dataset
We next
next conducted
conducted experiments
experiments assuming
assuming that
that the
the dataset
We
complete. LM
LM isis not
not aa suitable
suitable metric
metric for
for comparison
comparison here
here
isis complete.
since itit does
does not
not take
take into
into account
account tuples
tuples that
that are
are not
not in
in
since
dataset. Figure
Figure 77 shows
shows the
the DM
DM cost
cost results.
results. We
We see
see
the dataset.
the
that all
all three
three algorithms
algorithms have
have similar
similar costs
costs and
and there
there isis no
no
that
obvious winner.
winner. The
The MiRaCle
MiRaCle algorithm
algorithm loses
loses its
its flexibility
flexibility
obvious
111-C. This
This isis due
due
advantage discussed
discussed in
in item
item 33 of
of Section
Section III-C.
advantage

v:V. Experiments
Experiments
To
To compare
compare the
the flexibility
flexibility of
of MiRaCle,
MiRaCle, MiRaCleX
MiRaCleX and
and
single-table
single-tabIe (bitmap)
(bitmap) approach,
approach, we
we conducted
conducted experiments
experiments on
on
synthetic
synthetic data
data structured
structured as
as in
in Table
Table II.
11. We
We created
created 1000
1000
random
random students;
students; to
to each
each student
student we
we assigned
assigned I1 obligatory,
obligatory,
22 or
or 33 technical
technical elective,
elective, and
and 22 or
or 33 non-technical
non-technical electives
electives
from
22 courses.
courses. Each
Each course
course had
had 2,
2, 33 or
or 44 textbooks
textbooks to
to
from 22
choose from.
from. The
The distribution
distribution of
of courses
courses and
and books
books to
to students
students
choose
was
was designed
designed to
to match
match Bilkent
Bilkent University's
University's undergraduate
undergraduate
program
program requirements.
requirements. We
We ran
ran MiRaCle
MiRaCle and
and MiRaCleX
MiRaCleX on
on
the
the original
original database
database and
and the
the CDGH
CDGH anonymization
anonymization algorithm
algorithm
[15]
[15] on
on aa bitmap
bitmap transformation
transformation of
of the
the database.
database. We
We fixed
fixed
the
the cluster
cluster limit
limit to
to be
be 150.
150. To
To evaluate
evaluate the
the utility
utility of
of the
the
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8. Execution
Execution Time
figure

to the fact that entity anonymizations of MiRaCle are not
optimal which means there are cases where Bitmap approach
is better w.r.t. precision. However, in Figure 8,
8, we plot the
is
1.66GHz
execution time required to run both algorithms on a 1.66GHz
Intel Core Duo machine. Consistent with the disscusion in
items 6 and 8 of Section III-C,
111-C, MiRaCleX outperforms both
algorithms by a factor of at least 3 (This is true even though
we ignored the time spent to convert the dataset to the bitmap
anonymizations.) It should be noted that
format for bitmap anonymizations.)
execution times in all conducted experiments show similar
behavior. One important observation here is that MiRaCleX
have better or comparable utilization when compared to
itm map algorithms in all of the experiments
MiRaCle and Bitmap
however MiRaCleX is much faster than both algorithms. This
implies that underlying heuristic works for the experimental
dataset.
dataset.

Conclusions
VI. Conclusions
setting, single
We have shown that in a full database setting,
privacy,
table k-anonymity algorithms either fail to protect privacy,
or overly reduce the utility of the data. We proposed a
more flexible anonymity algorithm for snowflake schemas.
Support for arbitrary schemas with multiple private entities
can be considered as future work. Other proposed extensions
[2], i-diversity
&diversity
to k-anonymity such as weak k-anonymity [2],
6-presence [14]
[I41 application specific k[13], t-closeness [12], a-presence
anonymity [3], distributed k-anonymity [22], and personalized
anonymity [20] face similar challenges when considering
multi-relational k-anonymity.
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